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The TRIPS Council's Solution to the
Paragraph 6 Problem: Toward Compulsory




AIDS is a serious global health problem, affecting thirty-six
million HIV-positive people worldwide.1 Fortunately, lives can
be saved and prolonged with proper treatment.2 Although sev-
eral drugs are on the market to treat AIDS,3 access to these
pharmaceuticals is difficult for poor nations that cannot afford
the high prices charged by pharmaceutical companies.4 Some
critics argue that stronger patent laws lead to high drug prices.5
Drug prices increased after the Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS Agreement) took
force in 1995.6 As a result, "[g]overnments in developing coun-
tries [were] concerned with bringing the price of these medicines
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002, University
of Minnesota-Morris. Special thanks to my parents, Les and Louise Rogers, and to
Noah Keitel, for their constant support and encouragement.
1. Rosalyn S. Park, Note, The International Drug Industry: What the Future
Holds for South Africa's HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 126
(2002).
2. Id. at 127.
3. Anti-retrovirals are currently the most successful type of AIDS drug, dra-
matically reducing the amount of virus in the blood and significantly decreasing
mother-to-child transmission. Id. at 127-28.
4. See generally Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality:
Legal Options Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
103 (2003) (arguing that a full usage of exceptions to patents under the rules will
increase access to drugs for middle-income countries).
5. See, e.g., Park, supra note 1, at 125-26 ("Stronger patent protection means
higher drug prices .... "). But see Lazzarini, supra note 4, at 108 (noting that "[t]he
relationship between patent protection and price is [a] source of controversy").
6. Park, supra note 1, at 125.
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down, but in the process [came] under pressure from the devel-
oped world to comply with TRIPS in undertaking this process."7
Developing countries continue to struggle with this, but may be
aided by new developments that refine the TRIPS Agreement's
meaning regarding public health.
A practice known as compulsory licensing, allowed by the
TRIPS Agreement, is one way for developing countries to obtain
medicines more cheaply.8 However, Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement limits the ability of developing countries to use com-
pulsory licensing if they have little or no pharmaceutical manu-
facturing capabilities. 9 The WTO Ministerial Conference had
charged the TRIPS Council with fixing this problem, known as
the Paragraph 6 Problem, before the end of 2002.10
This Note explains the TRIPS Council's August 2003 Deci-
sion on the Paragraph 6 Problem in the context of past discus-
sions and explores its implications for developing countries.
Part I summarizes the origins of the TRIPS Agreement and ex-
plains the practice of compulsory licensing. Part II outlines the
Paragraph 6 Problem and proposed solutions, while Part III ex-
plains the new TRIPS Council Decision that addresses the prob-
lem. Part IV analyzes the Decision's solution and explores criti-
cisms of the Decision. This Note concludes that the Decision is a
positive step toward greater availability of medicine and will
likely give developing countries bargaining power in negotiating
cheaper drug prices.
7. Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 57, 61 (2002).
8. See Park, supra note 1, at 131-32.
9. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. 31(f), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or-
ganization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement]; Press Release, WTO NEWS 2003 Press Releases, Decision Removes Fi-
nal Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/pres03-3/pr350-e.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Press
Release].
10. WTO Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WTIMIN(01)DECIW/2 (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.wto.org/englishl
thewto e/minist..e/minOl_e/mindecl-trips-e.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter Doha Declaration]; see Press Release, supra note 9 (referring to the "Paragraph
6' issue").
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I. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND COMPULSORY
LICENSING
A. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT
Protection for intellectual property rights has existed on the
international level since as far back as the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883.11 The Paris Con-
vention established protection for trademarks and patents. 12
This treaty was criticized for failing to set substantive minimum
standards and merely requiring that member countries treat
foreign and domestic claimants equally.13
In 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) was created to address global intellectual property pro-
tection issues. 14 An agency of the United Nations, WIPO was
faulted for its weak enforcement, inadequate protection of intel-
lectual property, and ineffective dispute resolution system. 15
The TRIPS Agreement emerged in 1994 from the Uruguay
Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).16 The inclusion of intellectual property on the
agenda was the result of extensive lobbying by the United
States and pharmaceutical companies. 17 While WIPO may have
11. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (last revised July 14, 1967) [hereinafter Paris
Convention]. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, adopted in 1887 and modified most recently in 1971, provides copyright pro-
tection. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
12. L. Danielle Tully, Note, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and
Developing Countries After the Doha Conference, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129,
132 (2003).
13. See Tully, supra note 12, at 131-32; Naomi A. Bass, Note, Implications of
the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical Patent Laws in Bra-
zil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 191, 194-95
(2002). As a result, developing countries could sidestep intellectual property protec-
tions by refusing to recognize the protections domestically. The Berne Convention
did provide standards, but did not provide sufficiently clear provisions for enforce-
ment of rights. See Tully, supra note 12, at 132.
14. Bass, supra note 13, at 195.
15. See Tully, supra note 12, at 132 ("WIPO provided little in the way of coor-
dination during the 1970s and early 1980s.").
16. The Uruguay Round lasted from 1986 to 1994. Robert Weissman, A Long
Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellec-
tual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third
World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1077 (1996).
17. See id. at 1077 ("[The United States insisted that intellectual property pro-
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seemed a logical choice, GATT was instead chosen as the vehicle
for the international intellectual property agreement.' 8 For de-
veloped countries, GATT offered several advantages over WIPO,
including stronger enforcement and the ability to bind Member
countries to minimum standards. 19 In contrast, developing
countries such as India and Brazil opposed the inclusion of in-
tellectual property protection in GATT on the grounds that in-
tellectual property rights should not be joined with free trade.20
The Uruguay Round also established the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) to oversee GATT and TRIPS.21 In addition, the
Council for TRIPS (TRIPS Council) was created. 22 It is respon-
sible for managing the operation of the TRIPS Agreement, and
is accountable to the General Council of the WTO. 23
The goal behind creating the TRIPS Agreement was to be-
gin harmonizing global intellectual property laws.24 WTO mem-
bers are required to implement the TRIPS agreement into their
own intellectual property laws. 25 Article 27 of the TRIPS
Agreement sets out the definition of patents and patentable sub-
ject matter.26 According to Article 28, a patent holder has the
exclusive right of "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing" her product. 27 The patent holder also has the exclu-
tection be included in the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations .. "). The pharma-
ceutical industry aggressively encouraged the United States to adopt its concerns
about strict intellectual property protections as its own. Id. Tactics included fre-
quent testimony before Congress and funding of academic studies that praised strict
patent laws. Id. at 1076-77.
18. See Tully, supra note 12, at 133-34.
19. Id.; see also MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 1-2
(1996) (discussing events leading up to the Uruguay Round).
20. See Tully, supra note 12, at 133-34.
21. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(Apr. 15, 1994), Annex 1C, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs -e/legal-e/O4-wto.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2004)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
22. See WTO Agreement, supra note 21, art. iv, para. 5.
23. BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 8.
24. Ansari, supra note 7, at 60. The TRIPS Agreement supplements the Paris
Convention. Article 2.1 of the TRIPS Agreement states: "In respect of Parts II, III
and IV of this Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1-2 and Article 19, of
the Paris Convention (1967)." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.1. See also
Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 189 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
25. See Tully, supra note 12, at 134.
26. Article 27.1 says that "patents shall be available for any inventions,
whether products or processes .. " TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.1. The
provision requires novelty, an inventive step, and industrial applicability. Id.
27. Id. art. 28.1(a).
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sive right to license her product. 28
B. THE PRACTICE OF COMPULSORY LICENSING
Compulsory licensing allows a government to license a pat-
ent to a third party without the permission of the patentee,
though the patentee is still paid royalties. 29 Developing nations
are interested in compulsory licensing as a way to increase ac-
cess to drugs by lowering their price.30 The TRIPS Agreement
allows for compulsory licensing as one way for developing na-
tions to gain access to patented drugs.31 Article 31 is the provi-
sion on compulsory licensing, although it does not specifically
use the term.32 Under Article 31, Member nations may deter-
mine the reasons for which they will grant compulsory li-
censes. 33 This is in contrast to the compulsory licensing rules in
the Paris Convention, under which the primary reason for
granting compulsory licenses was a failure to manufacture the
patented item in the country in which the patent was held.3 4
Article 31 makes no such requirement. 35 The TRIPS Agreement
outlines several conditions that must be met before granting a
compulsory license. 36
28. Id. art. 28.2.
29. See Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs Under the TRIPS
Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101, 107 (2003).
30. See generally id. at 106-08 (stating that use of compulsory licensing pro-
motes lower prices for pharmaceuticals). However, developed countries often oppose
compulsory licensing, saying it "undermines intellectual property rights" and deters
developing countries from advancing their own pharmaceutical industries. Bass,
supra note 13, at 199.
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31; Divya Murthy, Comment, The
Future of Compulsory Licensing: Deciphering the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1299, 1319-20 (2002).
32. Article 31 states that "[w]here the law of a Member allows for other use of
the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder ... the
following provisions shall be respected .... TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art.
31. The "other use" is understood to refer to uses other than those allowed under
Article 30; that is, compulsory licensing. BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 90.
33. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31; BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at
90; JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 318 (2001).
34. BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at 90. Manufacturing a patented product in a
country where it is patented is known as "working" the patent. WATAL, supra note
33, at 318.
35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31. It is debated, however, whether
Article 27.1 forbids or allows countries from including the requirement of working
the patent in their own laws as a ground for compulsory licensing. See WATAL, su-
pra note 33, at 318 & n.64; Correa, supra note 24, at 203.
36. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31; BLAKENEY, supra note 19, at
20041
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
Articles 8 and 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provide further
guidance on compulsory licensing. Article 8.1 states that in de-
veloping post-TRIPS legislation, Members may "adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic ... development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement." 37 This provi-
sion gives policy guidance to Articles 30, 31, and 40, and implies
that a Member country cannot be punished for implementing
patent laws to protect the public interest. 38 Article 27.2 states,
"Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the pre-
vention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of
which is necessary to protect ordre public39 or morality, includ-
ing to protect human ... life or health. ... ,40 The scope of this
seemingly broad public health exception is narrowed by two re-
quirements: necessity and the absence of commercial exploita-
tion.41 It has been argued, however, that a country could get
around the commercial exploitation ban by distributing the
drugs non-commercially, through a state-owned or non-profit
group. 42 Despite its promise, compulsory licensing has never
been used under the TRIPS Agreement, although countries have
threatened to use it. 43
91-92. For example, these conditions include making an effort to get permission
from the rights holder before issuing a compulsory license and paying "adequate re-
muneration" to the rights holder. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, arts. 31(b),
31(h).
37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 8.1.
38. J. H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property
Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 36 (Carlos M.
Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
39. The term ordre public does not have a generally accepted definition, but is
understood as being narrower than public order and related to security and preven-
tion of riot and public disorder. Reichman, supra note 38, at 62.
40. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.2.
41. Id.; Weissman, supra note 16, at 1100.
42. Weissman, supra note 16, at 1100.
43. See Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Pub-
lic Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 870 & n.21 (2002) ("For something that has
never been used, compulsory licensing excites a surprising amount of confrontation,
pitting activists who tirelessly advocate it, against the pharmaceutical industry that
lives in fear of it.").
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II. THE PARAGRAPH 6 PROBLEM AND POTENTIAL
SOLUTIONS
A. THE PARAGRAPH 6 PROBLEM AND THE DOHA DECLARATION
The Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health (Doha Declaration) emerged from the Minis-
terial Conference (the Conference) of the WTO of November
2001 in Doha, Qatar. 44 The Conference unfolded in an atmos-
phere of increased awareness of the concerns of developing
countries in combating health problems. 45 The United States,
for example, became more receptive to public health or national
emergency exceptions to patent-holders' exclusive rights after
the September 2001 terrorist attacks and anthrax scares.46 The
main purpose of the Conference was to begin a new set of eco-
nomic negotiations to increase world trade flows; 47 nonetheless,
the Doha Declaration addressed several issues related to the in-
terpretation of TRIPS in light of current public health problems
in developing countries.48
In particular, the sixth paragraph of the Doha Declaration
addressed the problem with compulsory licensing and develop-
ing countries:
We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector
could face difficulties in making effective use of compul-
sory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct
the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to
44. See Murthy, supra note 31, at 1304-05.
45. See Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the
Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 54 (2002) (noting "the political climate prior to
the Doha meeting was favorable to the objectives of the developing countries .... ").
46. See Jose Marcos Nogueira Viana, Intellectual Property Rights, the World
Trade Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian Perspective, 17 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 311, 313 (2002).
47. Id. at 311.
48. Doha Declaration, supra note 10. The Doha Declaration stated,
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health.... [W]e affirm
that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all.
Doha Declaration, supra note 10, para. 4. WTO Ministerial Declarations, however,
are not legally binding in the dispute resolution process; treaty language would
trump any contradictory Ministerial Declaration. Sykes, supra note 45, at 54.
Nonetheless, the Declaration is likely to be persuasive authority, should a dispute
arise. Id.
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this problem and to report to the General Council before
the end of 2002.49
As the WTO Ministerial points out, the Paragraph 6 Prob-
lem affects nations with little or no ability to manufacture
pharmaceuticals. 50 The Paragraph 6 Problem arises from one of
the conditions a Member country must meet to issue a compul-
sory license under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement: 51 accord-
ing to Article 31(f), any use of compulsory licensing "shall be au-
thorized predominately for the supply of the domestic market of
the Member authorizing such use."52 This has been interpreted
to mean that most of the products produced under a compulsory
license must be intended for the licensing Member's domestic
market and not exported for commercial reasons.53
The requirement of Article 31(f) causes the Paragraph 6
Problem to have two interconnected aspects.5 4 First, Article
31(f) restricts the availability of export drugs made under com-
pulsory licenses, causing problems for poor nations who, lacking
sufficient domestic manufacturing capability, want to import
generic copies of the drugs that another country has manufac-
tured under compulsory licensing. 55 Second, the requirement
that compulsory licensees supply mostly to the domestic market
makes economies of scale unavailable to countries that could
otherwise export.56 Essentially, Article 31(f) does not account
for countries that may need to import or export products in or-
der to be able to use compulsory licensing at all. The result is
the Paragraph 6 Problem: compulsory licensing fails to enable
medicine-deprived developing countries that lack the capability
to manufacture drugs domestically to purchase drugs produced
abroad.
Rather than encouraging a literal reading, commentator
49. Doha Declaration, supra note 10, para. 6.
50. Id.
51. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31(f); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
52. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31(f) (emphasis added).
53. It has been suggested that the word "predominately" indicates that greater
than fifty percent of the products produced under compulsory licensing must be in-
tended for the domestic market of the licensee Member. See Sun, supra note 29, at
110 (citing Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469, 499
(2002)).
54. See Sun, supra note 29, at 110 (describing the nature of the problem in
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Amir Attaran 57 urges that Paragraph 6 must be interpreted
with reference to the Doha Declaration as a whole, and the sur-
rounding political atmosphere. 58 Paragraph 1 of the Doha Dec-
laration addresses the "public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries," and paragraph 4 re-
fers to "WTO members' right to protect public health, and in
particular, to promote access to medicines for all."59 In light of
these provisions, Attaran interprets Paragraph 6 as a charge to
solve the problem of lack of access to pharmaceuticals suffered
by developing countries with public health needs. 60
The TRIPS Council held numerous meetings in 2002 to dis-
cuss options for an "expeditious solution."61 WTO Trade Minis-
ters discussed the problem at a Mini-Ministerial meeting in No-
vember 2002, but did not reach a consensus. 62 The TRIPS
Council did not produce a final solution to the Paragraph 6
Problem by the 2002 deadline. 63 Nevertheless, it was predicted
that the Doha Declaration would embolden developing countries
to pass legislation to allow for compulsory licensing. 64
57. Amir Attaran is employed by the Kennedy School of Government at Har-
vard University. Attaran coauthored a controversial study asserting that patents do
not impede access to AIDS drugs in Africa. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do
Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286
J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1886 (2001); see Expanding Global Treatment Access: An Over-
view of the Issues, amfAR AIDS Research, at http://www.amfar.org/cgi.bin/iowa/news
/feat/record.html?record=19 (last visited Jan. 5, 2004) (describing the study as con-
troversial).
58. Attaran, supra note 43, at 864 (explaining that to be properly understood,
Paragraph 6 must be read in conjunction with the Doha Declaration as a whole, and
with an understanding of the surrounding political context).
59. Doha Declaration, supra note 10, paras. 1, 4.
60. Attaran, supra note 43, at 865. Attaran goes even further, concluding that
the Paragraph 6 mandate is not limited to TRIPS, but extends also to other non-
TRIPS areas of WTO jurisdiction, including pharmaceutical taxes and tariffs. Id. at
865-67. Attaran argues that under Paragraph 6, the TRIPS Council is also obligated
to put pressure on the WTO to make changes in these other areas, because the prob-
lem extends beyond the TRIPS Agreement. Id. at 867.
61. Sun, supra note 29, at 112.
62. Id. The Mini-Ministerial meeting took place in Sydney on November 14-15,
2002. Id.
63. See Press Release, WTO NEWS 2002 Press Releases, Supachai Disap-
pointed Over Governments' Failure to Agree on Health and Development Issues
(Dec. 20, 2002), at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr329_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2004).
64. Sykes, supra note 45, at 48.
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B. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE
PARAGRAPH 6 PROBLEM
Haochen Sun 65 proposes four criteria with which to evaluate
potential solutions to the Paragraph 6 Problem: accessibility,
sustainability, economic feasibility, and transparency. 66 Sun
asserts that these are important considerations for evaluating
whether a proposed solution will help developing country Mem-
bers implement their public health policies.67
Sun describes the accessibility feature as having three
"overlapping dimensions." 68  The solution to the Paragraph 6
Problem should be accessible to all without discrimination, ac-
tually physically and safely accessible, and affordable for all. 69
In discussing the sustainability feature, Sun notes that al-
though the Doha Declaration charges the TRIPS Council with
finding an "expeditious" solution, this does not mean that the so-
lution ought to be a temporary or transitional solution. 70
Rather, Sun argues that the solution should have a long-term
vision of setting up "a stable international legal framework that
will help the least-developed country Members to gradually
build a sound technological base to address their public health
and public policy concerns," as well as provide incentives to
stimulate companies in developing countries to manufacture ge-
neric drugs. 71 Sun also argues that for a proposed solution to be
economically feasible, it should bring needed drugs to the mar-
ket as quickly, easily, and inexpensively as possible, and should
create incentives for the production and exportation of the drugs
that developing country Members need. 72 As Sun puts it, "[a]
solution under paragraph 6 may be illusory if it does not benefit
countries where manufacturing is technically feasible but not
economically viable."73
65. Mr. Haochen Sun is the Assistant to the Secretary of the Center for WTO
Studies at Zhejiang University College of Law in China. See Forum on Science and
Technology for Sustainability, http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/forum.nsf/peo-
ple/SunHaochen (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). Mr. Sun has published several articles
on international intellectual property law, and has focused on the TRIPS Agreement
and its impact on human rights. Id.
66. Sun, supra note 29, at 112-15.
67. Id. at 112.
68. Id. at 113.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 113-14.
71. Id. at 114.
72. See Sun, supra note 29, at 114-15.
73. Id. at 115.
[Vol. 13:2
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Finally, Sun asserts that the proposed solution should re-
quire Members to report actions taken under the system to the
TRIPS Council, thereby providing transparency in the process
and helping to prevent exported products from being diverted
from their intended destination.7 4 Reporting of actions should
be required of both the exporting and importing members, with
the hope that the private sector will actually use the system
that is established.7 5
C. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PARAGRAPH 6 PROBLEM
Commentators have offered several solutions in response to
the Paragraph 6 Problem.7 6 These solutions fit into four main
types: an amendment to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, a
waiver of a Member's responsibilities under 31(f), a dispute set-
tlement-based solution, and an authoritative interpretation of
Article 30 of TRIPS.
1. Solution #1: Amendment to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement
One solution to the Paragraph 6 Problem is to amend or de-
lete Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. Because such an
amendment is "of a nature that would alter the rights and obli-
gations of the Members,"77 it would only "take effect for the
Members that have accepted them upon acceptance by two-
thirds of the Members and thereafter for each other Member
upon acceptance by it."78 In order to accept an amendment, a
Member delivers an instrument of acceptance to the WTO Se-
cretariat, but only after fulfilling the necessary requirements
under its domestic legal system. 79 The practical effect is that
before a Member country accepts an amendment, it must ratify
it at the national level.8 0 While Sun does not suggest how Arti-
cle 31 should be amended, he seems to suggest deleting the arti-
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Attaran, supra note 43, at 868-78; Murthy, supra note 31, at 1338-
45; Sun, supra note 29, at 132-36.
77. WTO Agreement, supra note 21, art. x, para. 3.
78. Id. In the case of an amendment that would not alter the rights and obliga-
tions of the Members, all Members can be bound by the vote of two-thirds of the
Members. Id. para. 4.
79. See Sun, supra note 29, at 117-18.
80. See id. at 118.
2004]
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cle's "predominately" requirement.8 1  Attaran and Divya
Murthy,8 2 on the other hand, propose amending TRIPS to create
an exception to Article 31(f) for Members to issue compulsory li-
censes to export to another Member that lacks the ability to
manufacture its own pharmaceuticals.8 3 Murthy also suggests
amending the definition of "third party" to include foreign enti-
ties when a Member does not have sufficient manufacturing
ability.8 4
Although an Article 31 amendment has the benefit of per-
manence, Attaran and Sun do not consider this the best op-
tion.8 5 Sun describes the national ratification requirements as
"legally insecure and time consuming."8 6 Bureaucratic problems
also arise when a product is patented in the importing country,
because Article 31 requires two compulsory licenses: one for the
exporting country and one for the importing country.8 7 In addi-
tion, Article 31(h) calls for the patentee to be adequately remu-
nerated when a compulsory license is issued.8 8 With two com-
pulsory licenses, this would result in the patentholder being
paid twice for the same product.8 9 Due to these problems, none
of the commentators have recommended the Article 31(f)
amendment as the best option. 90
2. Solution #2: Waiver of Responsibilities Under Article 31(f) of
the TRIPS Agreement
Sun and Attaran both address the potential solution of a
waiver of a Member's obligations under Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement. 91 The Ministerial Conference has the au-
thority to waive obligations imposed on a Member by the TRIPS
81. See id. at 116.
82. Divya Murthy received his JD in 2003 from American University, Washing-
ton College of Law. Murthy, supra note 31, at 1299 n.al.
83. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 868-70; Murthy, supra note 31, at 1341-44.
84. See Murthy, supra note 31, at 1341.
85. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 869-70; Sun, supra note 29, at 122-27.
86. See Sun, supra note 29, at 124.
87. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 869. Attaran's article includes a table that is
helpful in understanding the differences between an Article 31 amendment and an
Article 30 based solution. Id.
88. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31(h).
89. Attaran refers to this as "double compensation." Attaran, supra note 43, at
873 n.28.
90. See generally id.; Murthy, supra note 31; Sun, supra note 29.
91. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 874-75; Sun, supra note 29, at 118-19.
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Agreement.92 Attaran frames his discussion in terms of Member
countries requesting waivers on an individual basis, dismissing
this option as "slow and cumbersome," because the Ministerial
meets only every two years and because a waiver must be re-
viewed yearly after being granted.93 On the other hand, Sun
points to cases where the relevant Council recognized the need
for a waiver to apply to several Members, resulting in a "collec-
tive waiver."94 Thus, under the collective waiver situation, indi-
vidual countries would not each have to request a waiver. 95 The
requirement of yearly Ministerial review would still apply, how-
ever, and Sun cites this as a negative aspect of the waiver, along
with its temporary nature. 96 Because of the annual review,
Members might challenge the waiver yearly, perhaps arguing
that the exceptional circumstances justifying the waiver are no
longer present.97 Due to its temporary and potentially legally
unstable nature, the waiver is similarly not considered one of
the best options. 98
3. Solution #3: Dispute Settlement Solutions
A third category of potential solutions relates to an agree-
ment not to bring dispute settlement proceedings against Mem-
bers who produce and export generic pharmaceuticals intended
for poor countries without the manufacturing capacity in viola-
tion of Article 31(f). The first form this could take is a morato-
rium on dispute settlement, as discussed by Sun.99 In this
situation, WTO Members would agree not to bring a WTO com-
plaint against countries that produce patented pharmaceuticals
in the situation described above. 100 Although the WTO Agree-
ment does not specifically address moratoria, the Ministerial
Conference has the authority to decide on a moratorium on dis-
92. See WTO Agreement, supra note 21, art. ix, para. 3. The waiver process
would begin with a request for a waiver submitted to the TRIPS Council. Sun, su-
pra note 29, at 118. The Council would create a draft of the waiver, and send it to
the Ministerial Conference, which could then grant the waiver upon approval by
three-fourths of its Members. Id. at 118-19.
93. Attaran, supra note 43, at 874-75.
94. Sun, supra note 29, at 118.
95. See id. at 118-19.
96. See id. at 122-23.
97. See id. at 123.
98. See id. at 122-23; Attaran, supra note 43, at 869-70; Murthy, supra note 31,
at 1343-44.
99. See Sun, supra note 29, at 120-21.
100. See id. at 120.
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putes arising under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.101 A
related version of this solution is a rule of non-justiciability, as
discussed by Attaran. 102 This would involve the Ministerial
Conference amending Appendix Two of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), the codification of special WTO dispute
settlement rules. 103
The difference between a moratorium and a rule of non-
justiciability is that a moratorium is an agreement decided on
by the Ministerial Conference,1°4 while a rule of non-
justiciability actually becomes a part of the DSU by amend-
ment. 10 5 The United States argued in favor of a moratorium in
March 2002, because it would not require an amendment to
TRIPS and could be overseen by the TRIPS Council. 10 6 Sun dis-
misses the moratorium option because, like a waiver, it would
be a temporary solution. 107 In contrast, Attaran presents the
rule of non-justiciability as the best solution, arguing that it is
more consistent with the legal design of TRIPS and there are
precedents in WTO law for using a rule of non-justiciability. 108
4. Solution #4: Article 30-based Solutions
Another solution that has been suggested is an authorita-
tive interpretation of Article 30 under Article IX, Paragraph 2 of
the WTO Agreement. 109 This solution has the benefit of perma-
nence. 110 An interpretation can be adopted if three-fourths of
Members vote for it.111 Unlike the Article 31 solution, here only
one compulsory license would be required. 112 This solution also
avoids the double compensation problem found in the Article 31
101. See id.
102. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 871-77.
103. See id. at 875-76; Sun, supra note 29, at 120-21.
104. See Sun, supra note 29, at 120.
105. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 875-76.
106. See Richard Elliot, U.S. Offers Moratorium on Compulsory Licensing Dis-
putes, Rejects Amending TRIPS, at http://lists.essential.org/pipermailip-
health/2002-March/002760.html (Mar. 7, 2002) (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). At that
time the United States also opposed an amendment of Article 31 and an authorita-
tive interpretation of Article 30, two potential solutions the European Union had
presented. See id.
107. See Sun, supra note 29, at 122-23.
108. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 872-73.
109. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 868-70; Murthy, supra note 31, at 1344-45;
Sun, supra note 29, at 121-22.
110. See Sun, supra note 29, at 125.
111. See WTO Agreement, supra note 21, art. ix, para. 2.
112. Attaran, supra note 43, at 869; Murthy, supra note 31, at 1344.
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solution.113 In spite of this, Attaran argues that "an interpreta-
tion cannot achieve by the back door what would otherwise re-
quire an amendment."1 1 4 Although Attaran prefers the rule of
non-justiciability to this solution, both Sun and Murthy argue
that the Article 30 interpretation is the best solution.
In the end, these four potential methods of solving the
Paragraph 6 Problem each have their benefits and drawbacks.
As noted by Sun, although these features would be considered in
crafting the solution, the TRIPS Council's exact solution would
be the result of political negotiations.
1 5
III. THE TRIPS COUNCIL'S DECISION ON THE
PARAGRAPH 6 PROBLEM
After much discussion by commentators of what form the
solution should take, and prolonged negotiations by developed
and developing countries, on August 30, 2003, the Council for
TRIPS finally set forth its Decision in answer to the Paragraph
6 charge of the Doha Declaration. 116 Lauded as a "landmark
deal"117 and an "historic agreement for the WTO,"118 the Deci-
sion takes the form of a waiver of countries' obligations under
Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement, with respect to pharma-
ceutical products. 119 It is intended as an interim waiver that
will expire when an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement takes
effect, with such amendment to be based upon and to replace
the Decision. 120 In the Decision, the Council charged that work
should begin on such an amendment before the end of 2003, to
113. See Attaran, supra note 43, at 873 n.28; Sun, supra note 29, at 126.
114. Attaran, supra note 43, at 874 (highlighting Article IX, paragraph 2 of the
WTO Agreement).
115. See Sun, supra note 29, at 116.
116. Press Release, supra note 9; see Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/JL/540 (Aug. 30, 2003),
available at http:/www.wto.org/english/tratop-eTRIPS e/implem-para6_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Paragraph 6 Decision].
117. Scott Miller, WTO Drug Pact Lifts Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2003,
at A2.
118. Press Release, supra note 9.
119. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 2. The Decision was also wel-
comed by the head of the World Health Organization (WHO) as a "good step for-
ward." InteliHealth: HIV/AIDS, WHO Head Welcomes Decision to Let Poor Coun-
tries Import Cheap Drugs to Fight Killer Diseases (Sept. 2, 2003), at
http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIHWSIHWOOO/333/8013/368847.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter WHO Head Welcomes].
120. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 11.
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be completed within six months. 121 A statement by General
Council Chairperson Carlos P6rez del Castillo, Uruguay's am-
bassador, accompanied the Decision. 122
The Decision, formally titled "Implementation of paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public
health," sets out a system under which the requirements of Ar-
ticle 31(f) are waived in certain situations.123 The heart of the
Decision is found in paragraph 2, which states that "[tihe obli-
gations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of the TRIPS
Agreement shall be waived with respect to the grant by it of a
compulsory license to the extent necessary for the purposes of
production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and its export to an
eligible importing Member(s) ... ,"124
The waiver is a "collective waiver," designed to apply to a
number of Member countries. 125 Paragraph 1(b) outlines which
countries are eligible to import under the system. 126 Least-
developed country Members are by definition considered "eligi-
ble importing Member[s]." 127 A Member can also become eligi-
ble to import by notifying the TRIPS Council that it intends to
use the system. 128 Although under this provision all WTO
Member countries are technically eligible to import pharmaceu-
ticals, 129 the Decision lists twenty-three developed country
Members that have agreed not to use the system at all. 130 In
addition, several other Member countries have stated that they
will use the system only in extreme emergency situations. 131
121. Id.
122. The General Council Chairperson's Statement, WTO 2003 News Items, Aug.
30, 2003, at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news03 e/trips-stat 28aug03 e.htm
(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) [hereinafter Chairperson's Statement]; see Press Release,
supra note 9. The Chairperson's Statement focused on the issue of diversion of
drugs from their target market, a concern of pharmaceutical companies. See Chair-
person's Statement.
123. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116.
124. Id. para. 2.
125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
126. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 1(b).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Press Release, supra note 9.
130. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 1(b) & n.3. These coun-
tries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States
of America. Id. at n.3.
131. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 1(b). These countries include
Hong Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore,
Chinese Taipei, Turkey and United Arab Emirates. Press Release, supra note 9.
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The waiver covers only pharmaceutical products, which are
defined in paragraph 1(a) as "any patented product, or product
manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceuti-
cal sector needed to address the public health problems as rec-
ognized in paragraph 1 of the [Doha] Declaration." 132
The Decision sets out several requirements that must be
met for a country to use the system. 133 These requirements are
broken down into requirements for the eligible importing mem-
ber,134 requirements for the exporting Member's compulsory li-
cense, 135 safeguards against trade diversion, 136 and notification
requirements for the exporting Member.137
First, the eligible importing Member must notify the TRIPS
Council of the names and quantities of the products it is import-
ing. 138 If the Member is not a least-developed country, the Deci-
sion requires it to confirm that the Member has "established
that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector" for the particular products it plans to
import. 39 The Member must confirm that it has granted or will
grant a compulsory license if the product is patented in its terri-
tory.140
Second, the Decision calls for the exporting member to take
steps to ensure that the products produced under the system
will not be diverted from their intended market.' 4 ' It requires
that the exporting Member's compulsory license be for only the
amount needed by the eligible importing Member, and that all
of the production be sent to that Member. 4 2 In addition, the
132. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 1(a). This includes active in-
gredients and diagnostic kits. Id. "Vaccines" had been mentioned in earlier defini-
tions of pharmaceutical products, but were omitted in the final version. See Chak-
ravarthi Raghavan, Differences Unresolved On Implementing TRIPS and Public
Health (Third World Network), Nov. 25, 2002, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/
5243a.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
133. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 2.
134. Id. para. 2(a).
135. Id. para. 2(b).
136. Id. paras. 4, 5.
137. Id. para. 2(c).
138. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 2(a)(i).
139. Id. para. 2(a)(ii). According to the Annex to the Decision, "[1]east-developed
country Members are deemed to have insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in
the pharmaceutical sector." Id. at Annex. If at one time an eligible importing Mem-
ber found that its manufacturing capacity was insufficient to meet its needs, but it
later becomes sufficient, then the system would no longer apply. Id.
140. Id. para. 2(a)(iii); see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
141. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 2(b).
142. See id. para. 2(b)(i).
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products must be "clearly identified as being produced under the
system... through specific labelling or marking," which may
include special packaging, coloring or shaping of the products. 143
This information must also be posted by the licensee on a web-
site. 144 Several of the Decision's other provisions also address
preventing trade diversion.145 Paragraph 5 orders Members to
prevent the diversion into their countries of products produced
under the system, and provides for the TRIPS Council to review
the matter if any Member thinks another Member's measures
are insufficient in this regard. 146 Paragraph 4 directs eligible
importing Members to take "reasonable measures within their
means [and] proportionate to their administrative capacities" to
prevent trade diversion, and instructs developed country Mem-
bers to help with this upon request. 147 Finally, the exporting
Member must notify the TRIPS Council of the license and pro-
vide it with information regarding the license and licensee. 148
The Decision avoids the double remuneration problem of
the patentee being paid twice 49 by waiving the requirement
that the importing Member pay the patent holder when the ex-
porting member has already paid in accordance with Article
31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement. 50 The Decision also encourages
Members to overcome the problem outlined in the Doha Decla-
ration's Paragraph 6 by building up pharmaceutical sector ca-
pacity in developing country Members. 151
The final paragraph outlines the lifespan of the waiver and
143. Id. para. 2(b)(ii). This is required only where use of these distinguishing
features is "feasible" and does not raise the price significantly. Id.
144. See id. para. 2(b)(iii).
145. See id. paras. 4-5.
146. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 5.
147. Id. para. 4.
148. See id. para. 2(c). This information includes the "name and address of the
licensee, the product(s) for which the licence has been granted, the quantity(ies) for
which it has been granted, the country(ies) to which the product(s) is (are) to be sup-
plied and the duration of the licence," along with the address of the website required
in paragraph (2)(b)(iii). Id. para. 2(c).
149. See supra notes 36, 88-89 and accompanying text.
150. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 3.
151. See id. para. 7. Paragraph 7 encourages Members to pay special attention
to the pharmaceutical sector when working towards technology transfer to develop-
ing country Members pursuant to Article 66.2 of TRIPS and paragraph 7 of the
Doha Declaration. Id. Article 66.2 of TRIPS says, "[d]eveloped country Members
shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the
purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed coun-
try Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological
base." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 66.2.
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what is to happen when the waiver ends. 152 It provides that the
waiver will be in effect until an amendment to the TRIPS
Agreement replaces it.153 The proposed amendment to TRIPS
shall be rooted in the Decision.1 54 This provision also charges
the TRIPS Council to start work on the amendment before the
end of 2003, with the goal of completing the amendment six
months later. 155 This timeline makes the issue of yearly Minis-
terial review of the waiver (and possible challenges by Members)
less pressing, assuming the deadlines are met. 156
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PARAGRAPH 6 DECISION AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS
The TRIPS Council's solution appears to be a combination
of an interim waiver and a command to amend TRIPS.157 The
Decision calls for an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement to
create an exception for the particular circumstances required by
the Decision; the waiver is to be effective in the meantime.158
A. EXAMINATION OF THE DECISION UNDER THE FOUR SUN
CRITERIA
This section analyzes the TRIPS Council's recent Decision,
using the four criteria Sun employed to examine a solution's ef-
ficacy in solving the Paragraph 6 problem and helping develop-
ing country Members implement their public health policies.1 59
The Decision's strengths and shortcomings are discussed within
the framework of these criteria, which include accessibility, sus-
tainability, economic feasibility, and transparency. 160
1. Accessibility
Sun's first criterion is the accessibility of the solution on




156. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
157. See generally Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116.
158. See id. para. 11.
159. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (explaining how Sun uses his
criteria to analyze a potential Paragraph 6 solution).
160. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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various levels. 161 One question is whether the Decision results
in a scheme that is accessible to all people without discrimina-
tion.162
The Decision is accessible in the sense that all Member
countries are theoretically eligible to issue a compulsory license
under the system set out in the Decision. 6 3 The issue of how
health-related pharmaceuticals will in fact become safely and
actually available to the people in developing countries who
need it, however, is not addressed by the Decision. Some lead-
ers of developing countries seem optimistic that this Decision
should help developing countries gain access to more affordable
generic versions of needed drugs. 6 4 In the end, the Decision's
impact on this aspect of accessibility will not be known until the
Decision is used over time.
2. Sustainability
The second criterion for examining the Decision is sustain-
ability.165 Sun had concluded that because of its temporary or
transitional nature, waiver is not a sustainable solution, 66 but
perhaps, when coupled with the charge to amend Article 31 of
TRIPS within a certain time limit, the Decision passes the sus-
tainability test.
At the same time, the Article 31 amendment poses its own
problems on the sustainability question, especially with the
hurdle of national ratification.16 7 It could certainly not be a
long-term solution for the Paragraph 6 Problem to be fixed by a
temporary waiver, only to have it unravel when it came to na-
tional ratification of an Article 31 amendment. This could pre-
sent a problem for the Decision's sustainability. On. the other
hand, the fact that nations have already agreed to this Decision
may mean national ratification will not prove too large a hurdle.
161. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
164. For example, Kenyan Ambassador Amina Chawahir Mohamed praised the
Decision, saying, "This is good news for Africa. It is especially good news for the
people of Africa who so desperately need access to affordable medicine." Naomi
Koppel, WTO to Let Poor Nations Import Generic Drugs, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 31,
2003, at A14. See also WHO Head Welcomes, supra note 119 (reporting that South
Africa's health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang "welcomed the WTO an-
nouncement").
165. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 77-80, 86 and accompanying text.
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As noted, however, an Article 31 amendment is of a nature that
would affect the rights of Members. 168 An amendment of this
type would not take effect for any country that did not ratify or
had not yet ratified the amendment.169
This aspect of the national ratification requirement leads to
a potential uncertainty in the operation of the Decision. Para-
graph 11 states: "This Decision, including the waivers granted
in it, shall terminate for each Member on the date on which an
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions
takes effect for that Member."'170 The effect of this provision is
unclear, since it could mean that if Article 31 of TRIPS were
amended, but a Member had yet to ratify it, the waiver would
still be effective for the Member not yet ratified even though the
waiver has expired for other Member countries that ratified the
amendment. If this is so, it may or may not present a problem
when an exporting Member country grants a compulsory license
under the waiver to an importing Member that operates under
the amendment. If the amendment really will be drafted to
mirror the Decision, then perhaps there will be no problem since
the two would operate the same way. If, however, during politi-
cal wrangling the amendment comes to differ significantly from
the Decision, different requirements might create problems.
The possibility that the amendment will differ from the waiver
seems to be allowed by the language of the Decision, which says
the "amendment will be based, where appropriate, on this Deci-
sion ... "171 If the TRIPS Council became convinced during
preparation of the amendment that the waiver was lacking in
some way, it might decide not to include that aspect in the
amendment. There is evidence, however, that several Member
countries want to keep the amendment purely technical, and
simply incorporate the waiver into TRIPS without reviving dis-
cussion of its merits. 172 In sum, the sustainability of the Deci-
sion will depend heavily on the way TRIPS is amended and the
success of the ensuing national ratification process.
168. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
170. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 11 (emphasis added).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See TRIPS Council Shows Little Progress on Health and Biodiversity,
BRIDGES WKLY TRADE NEWS DIG., Nov. 26, 2003, at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03.
11-26/story4.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004) [hereinafter TRIPS Council Shows Little
Progress] ('Most Members stressed that this work should be a "technical" effort,
without re-opening the substance of the Decision.").
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3. Economic feasibility
Another benchmark for gauging the usefulness of a solution
to the Paragraph 6 Problem is its economic feasibility; that is,
whether the Decision creates a system that will make access to
needed medicines quick, easy, and inexpensive. 173 A related is-
sue is whether the Decision creates sufficient incentive for ge-
neric pharmaceutical manufacturers to produce and export low-
priced drugs to developing country Members who lack the capac-
ity to make their own.174 Paragraph 6 of the Decision instructs
developed country Members to "provide technical cooperation"
under Article 67 of TRIPS to develop a system of regional pat-
ents for developing and least-developed Members. 175 This is a
good step because it addresses the problem, but it does not set
up any formal mechanisms that will actually help developing
countries make use of compulsory licensing.
Paragraph 7 of the Decision encourages Members to use the
system set forth in the Decision to promote investment and
technology transfer by the pharmaceutical sector to fix the prob-
lem of countries not having sufficient manufacturing capaci-
ties.176 Although Paragraph 7 focuses specifically on the phar-
maceutical sector, it seems to merely reiterate what was already
set forth in Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha
Declaration.177 It would have been more effective for the Deci-
sion to propose a concrete system for helping developing country
Members build up their technology base.
It is not clear whether developing and least-developed coun-
try Members will make use of compulsory licensing under the
system. Nor is it clear whether the waiver-plus-Article 31-
amendment solution will prove economically feasible. The very
existence of this Decision may potentially increase competition
between generic drug manufacturers and the companies with
the patents, thereby decreasing drug prices. 178
173. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
175. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 6.
176. See id. note 116, para. 7; see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
177. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 7; see supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
178. See WTO OKs Deal on Cheaper Generic Drugs, REUTERS HEALTH, Sept. 1,
2003, at http://12.42.224.152/HealthNews/reuters/NewsStoryO9Ol2003l8.htm (last
visited Jan. 6, 2004) [hereinafter WTO OKs Deal]; supra note 30 and accompanying
text (noting that compulsory licenses may reduce drug prices).
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4. Transparency
The final criterion is the level of transparency achieved by
the solution. 179 Under this factor, the Decision seems to do
fairly well. The main concern of transparency is whether the
private sector will actually act within the system the solution
establishes.18 0 Paragraph 2 of the Decision sets out detailed no-
tification requirements for the exporting and importing Mem-
bers.18 ' Because the Members who use the system are required
to make the notifications, including posting information on a
website, this will help increase transparency of the use of the
system. 8 2 It will also help countries to guard against exported
products being diverted from their intended markets. The proc-
ess will hopefully be more efficient and accessible due to the fact
that WTO approval is not among the notification requirements
for eligibility of Member countries to import under the sys-
tem.183
In sum, the Decision will probably increase accessibility to
needed medicines, and though it is yet unclear how well the De-
cision fares under the sustainability and economic feasibility
criteria, the Decision provides a sufficiently transparent process
to genuinely help developing countries.
B. EXAMINING CRITICISMS OF THE DECISION
The Decision has been criticized for focusing too narrowly
on the concerns of developed country Members. 8 4 Developed
countries and pharmaceutical companies have worried that if
countries are allowed to import generic copies of drugs, these
drugs will be diverted from their destination and end up back in
developed country markets, 8 5 where the availability of cheap
drugs would undercut pharmaceutical company profits. 186 As a
179. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
182. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 2.
183. Id. at n.2; see supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., M~decins Sans Fronti~res, Chairman's Text Brings New Difficul-
ties to WTO "Paragraph 6" (Aug. 27, 2003), at http://www.msf.org/content/
page.cfm?articleid=77830ACA-8EC5-419A-82AB7D7ED6A2E1ED (last visited Jan.
5, 2004) [hereinafter Chairman's Text].
185. See Miller, supra note 117, at A2.
186. See Hugh McCullum, Drug Companies Use Their Muscle Against the Poor
(Southern African Research and Documentation Centre), Feb. 28, 2001, at
http://www.sardc.net/editorial/sanf/2001/iss4/SpecialReport.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2004).
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result of these concerns, the Decision includes a number of pro-
visions designed to provide safeguards against drug diversion.187
With all the attention the Decision devotes to this aspect, 188 to-
gether with the Chairperson's Statement, 8 9 these safeguards
will likely be effective against drug diversion. Ultimately, this
may be a positive result for developing countries, because if
pharmaceutical companies are satisfied that the waiver protects
their interests, there may be less opposition when the Article 31
amendment is drafted and ratified. 190
Debate rages as to the impact of the Decision on developing
countries, and whether it will actually help them at all. Critics
assert that the Decision's provisions create too many procedural
"hoops" for developing country Members to jump through in or-
der to use compulsory licensing. 191 On the other hand, most of
these provisions are designed to prevent drug diversion, a phe-
nomenon that also harms developing countries by further de-
priving patients in developing countries for which the medica-
tions were intended.192
Critics have also focused on the General Council Chairper-
son's statement that accompanied the Decision. 193 In this state-
ment, the Chairperson declares "the system . . . established by
the Decision should be used in good faith to protect public
health and ... not be an instrument to pursue industrial or
187. See supra notes 138, 141-48, and accompanying text.
188. Three of the Decision's eleven paragraphs address protection against trade
diversion. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, paras. 2, 4-5.
189. See Chairperson's Statement, supra note 122.
190. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 11 (charging the TRIPS
Council to begin drafting an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement by the end of
2003, to be based on the Decision).
191. Shapi Shacinda, WTO Rules Mean Life, Death to Africa, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Sept. 7, 2003, at 5, available at 2003 WL 57440840. The organization M~decins
Sans Fronti6res (a/k/a MSF or Doctors Without Borders) has also criticized the De-
cision and the accompanying Chairperson's Statement, saying:
The sum total of the Chairman's Statement and the [Decision] is a system
in which countries must jump through a multi-layered tangle of hoops to
get access to a few medicines. Any one of these hoops can easily be closed
off by political pressure or economic infeasibility, rendering the system ex-
tremely vulnerable.
Chairman's Text, supra note 184. The organization called upon WTO Members to
reject the Decision. See id.
192. See Put Fighting Disease First, STAR LEDGER, Sept. 10, 2003, at 14, avail-
able at 2003 WL 18727632.
193. See Chairman's Text, supra note 184; see also supra note 122 and accompa-
nying text.
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commercial policy objectives."194 Critics worry that this state-
ment is ambiguous and may make developing countries reluc-
tant to use compulsory licensing under the system. 195 One edi-
torial expressed the concern shared by developing countries that
if the statement "means no for-profit manufacturer or distribu-
tor can be involved at any level, the provision is a poison pill. It
is not reasonable to believe that any charitable operation can
gear up to make and supply what the global AIDS fight
needs." 196 Nonetheless, it seems generally understood that the
Decision will help developing countries in more than one way,
since developing country Members with the ability to manufac-
ture generic drugs will be able to supply those drugs to other
countries, thereby boosting their own economies. 197 Whether
the Chairperson's statement will negatively limit the Decision's
scope will depend on its interpretation by Member countries and
also on whether it becomes part of TRIPS via the amendment. 9 8
Attaran and others suggest further WTO ministerial action
for changes outside the TRIPS Council's jurisdiction. 199 If noth-
ing else, recommendations should have been made in the Chair-
person's Statement that accompanied the Decision.20 0 Such rec-
ommendations would have been a step towards addressing the
broader concerns set out in the Doha Declaration, 20 ' which Atta-
ran argues necessarily color the Paragraph 6 call to action. 202
Other areas of the access-to-medicines problem should have
been addressed in addition to the Paragraph 6 Problem of
TRIPS. For example, Attaran suggests "rolling back pharma-
ceutical access barriers such as taxes and tariffs" under
GATT.203
194. See Chairperson's Statement, supra note 122 (emphasis added).
195. See Press Release, MSF, Flawed WTO Drugs Deal Will Do Little to Secure
Future Access to Medicines in Developing Countries (Aug. 30, 2003), at http://www.
msf.org/content/page.cfm?articleid=C1540425-7F56-4D60-A6CB9D7ABA6D627F
(last visited Jan. 5, 2004) ('The statement.., adds another layer of uncertainty that
leaves developing countries vulnerable to pressure not to use the system.").
196. See Put Fighting Disease First, supra note 192.
197. See WHO Head Welcomes, supra note 119.
198. See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
200. See Chairperson's Statement, supra note 122.
201. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (quoting the Doha Declaration's
broad statements on the access-to-medicines and public health problems of develop-
ing countries).
202. See supra notes 58, 60 and accompanying text.
203. Attaran, supra note 43, at 867.
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C. THE LEGACY OF THE DECISION
Despite its shortcomings, the Decision is likely to be effec-
tive for several reasons. Before the time comes for national rati-
fication of an Article 31 amendment, the waiver will have been
in place for almost one year.204 Countries with large pharma-
ceutical companies might see compulsory licenses in action un-
der the waiver, and observe that with the safeguards in place,
trade diversion poses little threat.205 Perhaps after this "trial
period" provided by the waiver, national ratification would not
present as big a hurdle as previously predicted. 206 Then again,
this will only work if Member countries actually grant compul-
sory licenses under the system, a prospect that is uncertain. To
date, no countries have notified the TRIPS Council that they
will import 207 or export 208 under the Decision. 209
The Decision will probably be effective even if eligible
Member countries do not actually issue compulsory licenses un-
der its scheme, because it will likely act as a bargaining tool in
obtaining lower drug prices from pharmaceutical companies'
prices. 210 For instance, just under a week after the TRIPS
Council Decision was unveiled, Brazil's President Luiz Inacio
Lula da Silva signed a decree that authorized Brazil to import
generic versions of AIDS pharmaceuticals. 211 Brazil maintained
that patented drugs are too expensive to continue buying them
from multinational pharmaceutical companies. 212 Brazil ac-
knowledged that its new policy technically does not fall within
the TRIPS Decision, but analysts saw the move as "taking ad-
vantage of a climate of flexibility sparked by the recent WTO ac-
204. See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 11. The Decision came out
on August 30, 2003, and calls for work on the amendment to be completed by June
2004.
205. See supra notes 138, 141-48 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 86, 167-69 and accompanying text.
207. Notifications by Importing WTO Members (WTO, Geneva, Switzerland), at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/public_health notifLimport-e.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004).
208. Notifications by Exporting Members of the Grant of a Compulsory Licence
Under the Decision (WTO, Geneva, Switzerland), at http://www.wto.org/english/ tra-
top-e/trips e/public-health-notif-export-e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
209. See supra notes 128, 148 and accompanying text (discussing the Decision's
notification requirements).
210. See WTO OKs Deal, supra note 178 (quoting the idea that the Decision may
"acto as a negotiating leverage to make medicines available more cheaply"),
211. See Miriam Jordan, Brazil to Stir Up AIDS-Drug Battle, WALL ST. J., Sept.
5, 2003, at A3.
212. See id.
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cord."2 13 The decree came after negotiations with three pharma-
ceutical companies failed to advance to Brazil's liking.214
Changes like those in Brazil's laws are only one step in
making compulsory licensing a reality. The system's effective-
ness also hinges on Member countries changing their patent
laws to allow the grant of compulsory licenses for export in ac-
cordance with the Decision's conditions. 215 To date, Canada,
Norway, and Switzerland have begun this process. 216 In early
November 2003, Canada took the first step towards changing its
laws as the Canadian Parliament approved a bill that would
amend the Patent Act to allow generic pharmaceutical manufac-
turers to get compulsory licenses for producing and exporting
generic drugs to developing countries unable to make their
own.2 17 The bill will next go through committee hearings. 2 18
Canadian civil society organizations, while supporting the ini-
tiative, argued that the bill in its current form is flawed.219 In
addition, for the system to work, generic drug companies must
also decide to manufacture the generic drugs for export.
The Decision gave the end of 2003 as a deadline to start
work on amending the TRIPS Agreement to replace the tempo-
rary waiver. 220 In a communication circulated just before the
TRIPS Council's November 18, 2003 meeting, the European
Communities (EC) urged the Council to stick to this schedule.221
Still, a trade news digest reported that Members at the meeting
"appeared to have given little thought to how to convert [the De-
cision] into an amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, as called
213. See id.
214. Brazil had negotiated with Abbott Laboratories, Merck & Co. and Roche
Holding AG for several weeks before issuing the decree. See Associated Press, Bra-
zil Starts Patent Breaking AIDS Drugs (Sept. 5, 2003), at http://www.intelihealth.
comIIHIihtIHIWSIHWOOO/333/8013/368999.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2004).
215. See Communication from the European Communities on the Implementa-
tion of the General Council Decision on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/CIW/416 (Nov. 21, 2003), available at
www.wto.org [hereinafter Communication from the European Communities].
216. See TRIPS Council Shows Little Progress, supra note 172.
217. See UPDATE: Amendments to Canada's Patent Act to Authorize Export of
Generic Pharmaceuticals (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network, Montreal, Quebec),
Nov. 10, 2003, at http://www.aidslaw.caIMaincontentlissues/cts/patent-
amend/PatentActAmendmentUpdate.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 2-4. Among these flaws are the ability of patent-holders to take over
generic manufacturer contracts, limitations on which pharmaceutical products merit
a compulsory license, and the exclusion of non-WTO member countries. Id.
220. Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, para. 11.
221. See Communication from the European Communities, supra note 215.
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for in the Decision."222  Members agreed to conduct informal
consultations until the March 2004 TRIPS Council meeting.223
Various Members have suggested ideas on the form the
amendment should take. 224 The EC would like to see textual
changes to the TRIPS Agreement that "faithfully reflect" the
substance of the Decision, while the United States would rather
not alter the language of the Agreement, but would instead add
a footnote referring to the waiver and Chairperson's State-
ment.225 Yet another option is to add an annex to the TRIPS
Agreement that includes the text of the Decision. 226
One item of business that has been completed is the crea-
tion of the webpage on the WTO website for posting the import-
ing and exporting Member notifications.227 Now all that is
needed is a bold country to step up and test compulsory licens-
ing under the system laid out in the Paragraph 6 Decision.
CONCLUSION
The Decision presents a step in the right direction to in-
creasing the availability of cheap drugs to developing countries
suffering from health crises. The Decision does well as far as its
transparency, although whether the Decision will result in an
economically feasible, sustainable, and accessible system re-
mains to be seen. It is possible that countries will make use of
the Decision's compulsory licensing provisions to import generic
drugs. If nothing else, countries that previously could not im-
port generic drugs may now threaten to do so under the system
set out in the Decision. Thus, even if compulsory licensing re-
mains unused, the Decision will likely function as a bargaining
tool in favor of poor countries negotiating with pharmaceutical
222. See TRIPS Council Shows Little Progress, supra note 172. According to the




225. Communication from the European Communities, supra note 215.
226. See id.
227. TRIPS and Public Health: Dedicated Webpage for Notifications (WTO, Ge-
neva, Switzerland), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/publichealth
_e.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2004). The Decision outlines that these notifications
"will be made available publicly by the WTO Secretariat through a page on the WTO
website dedicated to this Decision." See Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 116, nn.5
& 9. As mentioned, the site currently lists no notifications. See supra notes 206-09
and accompanying text.
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companies. The Decision may also increase awareness of the
public health problems facing developing countries.
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